The history of peace in Tajikistan includes a noteworthy decision. In December 1996, six months before the signing of the General Peace Agreement, the parties agreed to establish a National Reconciliation Commission. In other words, difficult issues in the negotiations had not yet been fully resolved, but the parties were already seeking an answer to a more important question: once peace was signed, who would ensure its implementation, with what authority, and with whose participation? This question is particularly important for understanding the peace-oriented policy of the Founder of Peace and National Unity, Leader of the Nation and President of the Republic of Tajikistan, His Excellency Emomali Rahmon. At that stage, political leadership required both the courage to make decisions and the foresight to ensure that an agreement reached today would remain effective tomorrow.
On the Day of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, we usually remember the defining events in the history of independence. Among them, peace in Tajikistan holds a special place, because the continuation of state-building, the orderly functioning of institutions, and people’s return to peaceful lives depended on its outcome. Years later, a researcher’s task is not only to honour this achievement but also to explain how it was achieved. How did parties with little trust in one another come to take on shared responsibilities? How did issues that had no solution on the battlefield become matters for political decisions and legal instruments at the negotiating table? The value of Tajikistan’s experience becomes clear through answers to these questions.
When His Excellency Emomali Rahmon was elected Chairman of the Supreme Council at its 16th Session in November 1992, the newly independent state faced a crisis that clouded its future. The war had divided people who shared a common history and culture and who would have to live in the same country after the conflict ended. The state leadership therefore faced a challenge that went beyond restoring the work of government bodies. Citizens on both sides of the conflict needed to be able to imagine a future within one state. The decision to pursue negotiations came from recognizing this reality.
At critical moments in the inter-Tajik negotiations, the direct involvement of the Leader of the Nation, President of the Republic of Tajikistan, His Excellency Emomali Rahmon, became decisive. One such moment was the meeting in Khusdeh, Afghanistan, in December 1996. As continued fighting threatened the negotiations, the Head of the Tajik State met directly with Said Abdullo Nuri, leader of the United Tajik Opposition. The Khusdeh understanding paved the way for the ceasefire to take effect again and for negotiations to continue. The political significance of the meeting lay in the fact that the leaders of the parties personally assumed responsibility for their decisions. When trust has been damaged, such a meeting allows negotiating teams to continue discussing difficult issues, supported by the clearly expressed will of their leaders.
One of the important features of this process was the step-by-step resolution of issues. The parties did not want the fate of the entire negotiation process to depend on resolving every disagreement at once. They first agreed on the main principles for establishing peace. Separate documents were then signed on refugee issues, military matters, political participation, and guarantees for implementing the agreements. This approach allowed both parties to understand precisely what had been agreed and to leave unresolved issues for the next round. Each agreement created specific obligations, and fulfilling them laid the groundwork for the next step.
The establishment of the National Reconciliation Commission was one of the decisions that gave practical form to political accord. The parties agreed to have equal representation on the Commission and to entrust its leadership to a representative of the United Tajik Opposition. The significance of this decision must be understood in the context of the time. Representatives of both parties now had to sit together in a joint body to discuss how commitments would be implemented, what difficulties had arisen, and how to address them. Someone who had previously voiced only their own side’s demands now took part in shaping a decision whose implementation mattered to both parties. This experience of working together had value in its own right for building trust.
One example clearly illustrates the legal dimension of this process. The Protocol on Political Issues of 18 May 1997 set out a procedure for considering mutual forgiveness and adopting an amnesty act. As negotiations neared their conclusion, the parties also agreed that a draft general amnesty act would be discussed by the National Reconciliation Commission and submitted to Parliament for consideration. This single issue makes the roles of several institutions clear: the parties’ leaders expressed the political will, the Commission was responsible for joint discussion, and Parliament was entrusted with considering the relevant act. This is an important point for legal scholarship: a decision reached in negotiations had to be incorporated into the country’s legal system in accordance with the powers of state bodies.
The return of refugees expresses the human dimension of the policy of national accord more clearly than any other measure. The peace documents emphasized three conditions for return: people had to return home voluntarily, in safety, and with their dignity protected. Each condition had a specific meaning. Voluntary return gave individuals the right to decide for themselves. The requirement of safety placed responsibility on the parties to create conditions for a peaceful life. Protecting dignity defined how returnees were to be treated. They were returning to their homeland as citizens with the right to live and build a future in their own country. This approach to people gave the concept of national accord real meaning.
On 27 June 1997 in Moscow, the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, His Excellency Emomali Rahmon; Said Abdullo Nuri, leader of the United Tajik Opposition; and Gerd Merrem, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, signed the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan. The document’s title accurately expressed its substance. The word “General” indicated that protocols and agreements reached at different stages now formed parts of a single accord. The phrase “national accord” described a goal that would require long-term work even after the fighting had ended. The success of the peace policy now depended on how decisions signed in the capitals were implemented in cities and districts, and when people would feel their effects in their own lives.
The United Nations and countries supporting the process, including Russia and Iran, played an important role in advancing the negotiations. They helped arrange meetings between delegations, supported continued dialogue during difficult stages, and assisted with the implementation of agreements. Tajikistan’s experience also demonstrates the importance of the parties’ own political will. A mediator could make a meeting possible, but the Tajik leaders had to decide to attend it. An international organization could assist with implementing an agreement, but the signatories remained responsible for honouring their commitments and answering to the people. It was through this consistent choice of a political path that the personal contribution of the Leader of the Nation, President of the Republic of Tajikistan, His Excellency Emomali Rahmon, became especially evident.
For academic research on peace in Tajikistan, it is particularly important to compare documents from that period with the recollections of those who took part in the events. The text of a protocol shows what commitments the parties undertook. Participants’ recollections help explain why agreeing on even a seemingly brief clause sometimes took a long time. The account of a resident who returned to their home answers another question: what did that decision change in their life? Studying these three perspectives together brings the history of peace into view with all its difficulties and significance. In my view, this is a broad field of study for young Tajik researchers. They can record eyewitness accounts, compare them with the documents of that period, and pass on the experiences of different communities to future generations.
The legacy of peace in Tajikistan is also a valuable resource for legal education. For example, a trainee in a professional development course could be given the text of an agreement and asked to identify three things: who undertook the obligation, which authority was responsible for implementing it, and what action would allow citizens to see the result. When considering amnesty, the trainee learns the difference between a political agreement and a legal act. When studying refugee issues, they see how a legal concept such as voluntary return protects a person’s individual choice. This kind of learning develops a habit that is essential at every stage of state-building: thinking about the consequences of a decision for people before making it.
Today, preserving national accord is also reflected in the everyday conduct of institutions and in the way citizens treat one another. When people can trust that their applications and complaints will be heard, the reasons for decisions will be explained, and a lawful way to defend their rights is available, they feel like equal members of society. In such an environment, disagreements are more likely to be resolved through dialogue. For justice-sector employees, this historical lesson is also a professional responsibility. Sometimes a person’s trust in justice begins with a well-reasoned response, a timely correction of an error, or the patience of an employee who listens to them to the end.
On the Day of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, as we pay tribute to the historic services of the Founder of Peace and National Unity, Leader of the Nation and President of the Republic of Tajikistan, His Excellency Emomali Rahmon, it is worth remembering the choices made during those years. In Khusdeh, this choice was reflected in the continuation of negotiations; in Moscow, in the acceptance of shared commitments; and in the work of the National Reconciliation Commission, in carrying them out. The people who returned home, rebuilt their lives, and raised their children in peace felt the results of these efforts. For our generation, honouring this achievement has a specific meaning: to study the history of peace accurately, value commitments and trust, and remember our responsibility for Tajikistan’s shared future even when we disagree.
Gayurzoda Shukhratullo Karomatullo
Deputy Rector for Research, Institute for Advanced Training of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Tajikistan.